By Thomas F. Schwartz
Fighting a war is costly both in human lives and military expenditures. More costly is securing a just peace with defeated enemies. As a previous blog explained, Herbert Hoover failed in his attempts to feed civilian populations in Poland and Finland at the outset of World War II, but not for the want of trying. After World War II, he was recruited by President Harry S. Truman to conduct fact finding missions on the postwar food relief needs of Europe and especially Germany. Two new studies—Richard A. Leiby, 1947: Making the World Over (2025) and Zachary Shore, This Is Not Who We Are: America’s Struggle Between Vengeance and Virtue (2023), examine Hoover’s critical role in shaping government policy toward Germany. Hoover advocated for a reindustrialized and dynamic German economy capable of feeding its population, and dismantling the Morgenthau Plan that sought to create a weak and pastoral Germany.
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was a Hudson River neighbor of Franklin Roosevelt and supporter of Roosevelt as Governor of New York. As President, Roosevelt appointed Morgenthau as Treasury Secretary. He served in that capacity until Roosevelt’s death in 1945 and continued under President Truman until he was replaced later that year. Because of Morgenthau’s close relationship with Roosevelt, his views on limiting Germany to a weak agricultural economy after the war were reflected in early post-war planning documents and a US government directive to occupying forces known as JCS 1067. The goal was to “ensure,” according to Leiby, “that Germany would never again threaten world peace, and so the country was to be disarmed, denazified, and decentralized.” The Morgenthau Plan’s purpose was to prevent Germany from ever having the capability to wage war on its neighbors.
Leiby argues that while the Morgenthau Plan might have been well intended, it was unrealistic. Europe depended on Germany’s capacity for heavy industry, and for the German economy to be self-sustaining, the restoration of its industrial base was necessary. Hoover entered the story in 1946 when President Truman asked Hoover to serve as honorary chair of the Famine Emergency Committee. The 71-year-old former President spent three months visiting 35 countries to provide Truman with an assessment of post-war humanitarian needs. But the winter of 1946-1947 was especially severe, making food and coal shortages especially acute in Germany. By US military estimates, most Germans were receiving only half or less of the 2,000 calories required to maintain healthy nutrition. At greatest risk were children, women, and the elderly. Truman once again reached out to Herbert Hoover to specifically address the food crisis in Germany. Hoover understood the problem was more than food but also involved rebuilding the German economy for self-sufficiency. He indicated to Truman he would accept the assignment only if he could address issues beyond food needs. The compromise was for Hoover to conduct “an economic mission directed to food and its collateral problems.”
Hoover’s reputation in effectively providing food relief on a mass scale did not fail him in 1947 Germany. Assembling a team of trusted and seasoned assistants from past relief efforts, Hoover met with military and government officials in Germany to assess the situation. German-speaking aides gathered information from ordinary citizens for their concerns and perspectives. Hoover wrote three different reports and submitted them to Truman, one on agriculture in Germany, one on agriculture in neighboring Austria, and one on economic recovery.
Hoover agreed that not all members of the Nazi party were loyalists and some had merely adopted the façade of loyalty. The need for competent administrators was more important. He also opposed the idea of separating the industrial Ruhr valley from Germany. Knowing that the food available was not sufficient to meet the caloric needs of the German population, Hoover recommended increasing the amount of food aid provided to children, which came to be called Hooverspeisung (Hoover meals, or more literally, Hoover feeding) that a previous blog described. General Lucius Clay claimed Hoover’s contributions “did more to convince the German people of our desire to recreate their nation than any other action on our part.” Without Hoover’s assistance, Clay felt “we would have had mass starvation.”
Leiby argues that Truman and military leaders had come to the conclusion that the Morgenthau Plan was unworkable and JCS 1067 needed to be replaced. Hoover’s reputation as a humanitarian and influential Republican provided a means to dismantle the Morgenthau Plan and replace it was something more effective for the changing conditions of postwar Germany. Hoover’s arguments for rebuilding the Germany economy and effectively feeding the German population helped win over Republicans in Congress. The political consequences of Hoover’s endorsement required Truman to ultimately take credit for any success in Germany. As Leiby argues: “Having sanctioned the mission, Truman had to acknowledge and act on his [Hoover’s] recommendations, while simultaneously asserting his own foreign policy identity. The Marshall Plan proved a suitable compromise. It could incorporate many of Hoover’s recommendations for Germany while casting them in a framework for general European revival that was purely ‘Truman.'”
Every assignment has a downside and for Hoover, the 1947 trip produced several health problems. He suffered a constant cold because the coal shortages meant every building where he held meetings required participants to wear multiple layers of clothing. His eardrum burst due to air pressure changes on a flight causing him to wear a hearing aid the reminder of his life. He also came down with a case of shingles at the end of the year. Truly Hoover’s willingness to serve had come at a cost.
To be continued…